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FREDERICK SCHAUER

"PRIVATE" SPEECH AND THE
"PRIVATE" FORUM: GIVHAN v.
\VESTERN LINE SCHOOL DISTRICT

Short opinions, like "great" cases and "hard" cases/ often make
bad law. A satisfactory judicial opinion need not be long. Concise
prose and direct analysis are admirable if frequently ignored judicial virtues. They are not necessarily to be found in shan opinions.
Constitutional adjudication, particularly by the Supreme Coun,
must to some extent be both prospective and advisory, anticipating
problems to which the announced principles will be applied. No
amount of academic prattle about holdings, dicta, and ratio decidendi can dispel the fact that, in couns other than the Supreme
Court, the law is what the Supreme Coun says by its words as much
as it is what the Coun holds by its decisions. If the Coun were to
say that two plus two equals five, as it so frequently does, then for the
lower courts two plus two equals five, even when that assertion by
the Court was unnecessary to its decision. Thus, brevity may be a
judicial vice when it results in the pronouncement of broad prinFrederick Schauer is Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of
Law, College of William and Mary.
The author is grateful for the assistance of Tom Collins, Mary Jane Morrison,
and Doug Rendleman, all of wl!om provided cogent criticisms of an earlier draft
of this article.
1 "Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law." Northern Securities Co. v. United
States, 193 U.S.197, 400 (1904) {Holmes, J., dissenting).
@ 1980 by The University of Chicago. 0-226-46432-6/80/1979-0003$02.56
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ciples that are unqualified and unjustified. When explanation and
qualification are lacking, the words of the Supreme Court may be
used to support results neither intended by the Court nor covered
by an inadeqpate rationale underlying the opinion.2
A recent example of this phenomenon is the Supreme Court's decision last Term in Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School
District.3 In that case, a junior high school teacher had on numerous
occasions complained to her principal, in the principal's office, about
alleged racial discrimination in the school. These complaints antagonized the principal, and the teacher's contract was not renewed.
The district court held that the dismissal violated the First Amendment.4 The Fifth Circuit reversed that judgment, ruling that "private" speech such as that involved here was wholly outside the First
Amendment.5 A unanimous Supreme Court needed only a few
pages to reject the Fifth Circuit's view of the First Amendment as
"erroneous." 6 The Court held that the teacher's statements to the
principal in his office could not, consistent with the First Amendment, be used to justify the teacher's dismissal. Mr. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court, rejected any distinction between private and public speech, finding such a distinction supported neither
by the words of the First Amendment nor by any of the Court's free
speech cases.
There are difficult issues involved in the contrast between speech
in a public forum and speech in private conversation, as well as in
the extent to which the First Amendment protects a public employee
who communicates his or her views on the employer's time and
on the employer's premises. The complexity of these problems is
2 The paradigm is perhaps Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (194-2). There a
"casual, almost offhand" (Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 4-98, 514 [1959]
[Douglas, ]., concurring]), statement of the commercial speech exception to the
First Amendment established a principle that survh·ed for twenty-four years, until
its demise in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council,425U.S.748 (1976).
3

99 S. Ct. 693 (1979).
Ayers v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 404 F. Supp. 1225 (N.D.
Miss. 1975). This opinion deals only with damages, interest, and attorneys' fees.
Judge Smith's prior ruling on the merits is unreported.
5 Ayers v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 555 F.2d 1309. (5th Cir.
1977).
4

6

99 S. Ct. at 695.
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clouded more than it is illuminated by the Court's conclusory opinion in Givhan.

1.

THE GIVHAN CASE

A. HISTORY

From 1963 until1971 Bessie Givhan served as a junior high school
teacher in three different schools in the Western Line Consolidated
School District, which encompassed part of two counties near
Greenville, Mississippi. 7 The school district lacked a tenure system, and she was employed under a series of one-year contracts.
During this period, race relations was a subject of considerable
significance and controversy both in the community and in the
schools in which Bessie Givhan taught. Since 1969 the schools in
the district had been operating under a desegregation order issued
by the district court pursuant to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District. 8
On frequent occasions during the 1970-71 school year Givhan
objected to various practices within the school. Primarily, she contended that racial segregation existed in the appointment and assignment of nonprofessional employees such as administrative and clerical staff and lunchroom workers. 9 These objections were presented
to the principal, Leach, in his office. Some complaints were presented orally and others in writing; all were characterized by Givhan
as "requests" and by Leach as "demands." 10
In 1971 Givhan was informed that she would not be rehired for
the following academic year. In making that decision, the superintendent of schools had followed Leach's recommendation, which
read in part as follows: 11
7 The Supreme Court's statement of the facts is elliptical. The facts here are
derived from the Supreme Court opinion, the opinion of the Fifth Circuit, note 5
S11PT<7, the opinion on remedies of the district court, note 4 S11pra, and the unpublished district court opinion on the merits, Appendix to Petition for Certiorari,
at 27a.
R419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'd and remanded S1lb nom. Carter v. West
Feliciana Parish School Board, 396 U.S. 290 (1970), on remand, 425 F.2d 1211 (5th
Cir. 1970).
9 555 F.2d at 1314.
10 Id. at 1313.
11 I d. at 1312.
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Ms. Givhan is a competent teacher, however, on many occasions she has taken an insulting and hostile attitude towards
me and other administrators. She hampers my job greatly by
making petty and unreasonable demands. She is overly critical
for a reasonable working relationship to exist between us. She
also refused to give achievement tests to her homeroom students.
Givhan sued the school district, alleging that her dismissal was
impermissibly motivated by and based on her complaints to Leach,
conduct she claimed was protected by the First Amendment. The
district court agreed, finding that "the school district's motivation
in failing to renew Givhan's contract was almost entirely a desire to
rid themselves of a vocal critic of the district's policies and practices which were capable of interpretation as embodying racial discrimination."12
The Fifth Circuit reversed. The Court of Appeals did not find it
necessary to consider the balancing analysis for speech by public
employees mandated by Pickering v. Board of Educati01113 and
Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle. 14 In Pickering the Supreme Court held that a teacher could not be dismissed on the basis
of a letter to the editor of a local newspaper in which the teacher
criticized the board of education. 15 As long as the public expression
by a teacher was not intentionally false, 16 the speech was presumptively protected, although it remained necessary to balance the free
speech rights involved against the interests of the school as employer in preserving close working relationships, confidentiality, and
professional competenceP In 1977 the Court held in Mt. Healthy
12

!d. at 1314, quoting the unreported opinion of the district court.

13

391

15

u.s. 563 (1968).

14

429

u.s. 274 (1977).

Pickering had sent a letter to a local newspaper in connection with a proposed
tax increase. The letter was critical of the way that both the board of education
and the superintendent of schools had handled previous revenue proposals. He was
dismissed because his letter was found to be "detrimental to the efficient operation
and administration of the schools of the district." 391 U.S. at 564.
16
Pickering specifically adopted the standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964). 391 U.S. at 573-74.
17
391 U.S. at 568-72. The Court in Pickering did little more than hint at ways
in which other cases might be differently decided if the speech were different or
the nature of the relationship were different. One commentator has gleaned from
the Pickering opinion fourteen different factors that go into the balance. Zillman,
Free Speech and Military Conrmand, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 423, 450-51. On Pickering
generally, see Van Alstyne, Tbe Constitutional Rigbts of Teacbers and Professors,
1970 DuKE L.J. 841, 848-54.
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that, where a teacher had been dismissed on the basis of the kinds of
statements held protected in Pickering, the dismissal could still be
upheld if the school board could demonstrate by a preponderance
of the evidence that it would have dismissed the teacher even in the
absence of the protected expression. 18
The Fifth Circuit did not apply this balancing analysis because it
did not find Givhan's actions covered in any way by the First
Amendment. Pickering and Mt. Healthy come into play only when
the teacher has engaged in First Amendment conduct and when
that conduct has played a part in the dismissal. If no First Amendment conduct is involved, then the Pickering-Mt. Healthy issues
are never reached. The Fifth Circuit disposed of the case at this
threshold stage: 19
The strong implication of [Pickering, Mt. Healthy, and Perry
v. Sindermamz 20 l is that private expression by a public employee is not constitutionally protected.... Neither a teacher
nor a citizen has a constitutional right to single out a public
employee to serve as the audience for his or her privately expressed views, at least in the absence of evidence that the public
employee was given that task by law, custom, or school board
decision.
The Fifth Circuit's decision is thus based on two distinct but related grounds. First, speech in the "private forum" is not covered
by the First Amendment. Second, the First Amendment does not
protect the speaker who forces his views on an unwilling listener.
B. THE SUPREME COURT OPINION

The Supreme Court found Givhan an easy case. The Fifth Circuit
had made an obvious and fundamental error in First Amendment
doctrine. For a unanimous Court, Mr. Justice Rehnquist said that
it was mistaken to view the activity in question as outside the scope
1"429 U.S. at 287. The burden shifts to the school board after the teacher has
met the burden of showing that he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct
and that that conduct was a "substantial factor" or "motivating factor" in the decision to dismiss or not to rehire. Ibid. The relevant conduct in Mt. Healthy was a
telephone call to a radio station. I d. at 281-84.
10 555 F.2d at 1318-19.
20 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Perry is best known as the procedural due process case
dealing with de facto tenure. The opinion also makes it clear, however, that Pickering applies to the decision not to retain a nontenured teacher. ld. at 598.
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of the First Amendment merely because it occurred in the principal's private office. Although the speech in Pickering, Perry, and
Mt. Healthy had indeed taken place in the public forum, the fact of
the public forum was irrelevant to the holdings in those cases.21 And
once the distinction between Givhan's complaints in the principal's
office and Pickering's letter to a newspaper is removed, Bessie
Givhan's case falls squarely within the principles of Pickering and
Mt. Healthy :1.2 The dismissal can then only be sustained if the
school board can involve one of the special justifying reasons found
in Pickering, 23 or if the school board can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have dismissed her even
in the absence of the constitutionally protected conduct. The
Court's opinion very strongly suggests that, as to the quality of the
speech justifying removal, the result must be the same as in Picker21
"This Court's decisions in Pickering, Perry, and Mt. Healtby do not support
the conclusion that a public employee forfeits his protection against governmental
abridgment of freedom of speech if he decides to express his views privately
rather than publicly. While those cases each arose in the context of a public employee's public expression, the rule to be derived from them is not dependent on
that largely coincidental fact." 99 S. Ct. at 695-96.
22 In holding that Pickering protection was not lost by the private or personal
or limited nature of the speech, Givban was consistent with virtually all lower
court decisions addressing this issue. The most extensive discussion is in Pilkington
v. Bevilacqua, 439 F. Supp. 465 (D.R.I. 1977). "Certainly his criticisms do not lose
the protection of the First Amendment by reason of their being prudently directed to his co-employees and superiors ... instead of to the public at large."
ld. at 474-75. See also ]annetta v. Cole, 493 F.2d 1334, 1337 n.4 (4th Cir. 1974);
Hostrop v. Board of Junior College District No. 515, 471 F.2d 488, 493 n.13 (7th
Cir. 1972); Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 338 (lOth Cir. 1973); Ring v. Schlesinger,
502 F.2d 479,489 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Downs v. Conway School District, 328 F. Supp.
338 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Phillips v. Puryear, 403 F. Supp. 80, 87-88 (W.D. Va. 1975);
Johnson v. Butler, 433 F. Supp. 531, 535 (W.D. Va. 1977). The strongest precedent
for the Fifth Circuit's exclusion of private speech is Roseman v. Indiana University
of Pennsylvania, 520 F.2d 1364, 1368 (3d Cir. 1975). Some of the foregoing cases
dealt with private complaints quite similar to those in Givban. Others dealt with
the circulation of petitions or complaints among a number of colleagues. \Vhile
neither is fully public, the latter seems clearly more so. See Rosado v. Santiago, 562
F.2d 114 (1st Cir. 1977) (holding the circulation of a letter among colleagues to
be protected speech, but specifically reserving the issue of whether a purely private
letter to one's superior is protected).
23 See note 17 supra. Among the most important of these reasons, as suggested
in Pickering, are a particular threat to internal discipline, 391 U.S. at 569; a particular threat to harmony among co-workers, ibid.; Jeopardizing a close working
relationship with an immediate superior, id. at 570; presen•ing a special need for
confidentiality, id. at 570 n.3, 572; or statements "so without foundation" as to call
into question a teacher's fimess for the position, id. at 573 n.5.
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ing, where none of the proffered justifications were found acceptable.24 But as to the second factor-independent grounds for dismissal-the record was less clear. The case had been tried in the district
court before Aft. H eaftfjy was decided, and thus the school board
had neither reason nor opportunity to attempt to prove that it would
not have rehired Givhan even without the presence of the constitutionally protected criticism. The Supreme Court therefore remanded
the case so that the district court could make the appropriate .findings on this aspect of the i}lt. Healtby analysis. 25
The Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that
the principal was a captive and unwilling audience. "Having opened
his office door to petitioner, the principal was hardly in a position
to argue that he was the 'unwilling recipient' of her views." 26 The
reversal on this point is almost wholly factual. Nothing in the Court's
opinion suggests any expansion of the very limited circumstances
in which the presence of an unwilling audience diminishes the extent of free speech protection. Coben v. California21 and Erznoznik
v. Jacksonville 28 emerge untouched, 29 and so do Rowan v. Post
~ 4 In commenting on the conclusion by the Court of Appeals that Givhan's
statements may have jeopardized a close working relationship with her immediate
superior, the principal, the Court said that "we do not feel confident that the
Courts of Appeals' decision would have been placed on that ground notwithstanding its VIew that the First Amendment docs not require the same sort of
Pickering balancing for the prh·ate expression of a public employee as it docs for
public expression." 99 S. Ct. at 696 (footnote omitted).
~:;Givhan had allegedly engaged in several acts of insubordination not involving
First Amendment questions, such as a refusal to give certain standardized tests to
her students. 99 S. Ct. at 694 n.l, 695 n.2. The Court's opinion suggests that some
of these acts, if substantiated, might support a finding that she would not have
been rehired e\•cn were it not for the complaints. ld. at 697 n.5. The brief concurring opinion of l\Ir. Justice Stc,·ens, directed solely to this point, takes the position that the previous proceedings most likely preclude a successful Mt. Healthy
claim by the school board. ld. at 697-98.
~1 99 S. Ct. at 696.
28 422 U.S.205 (1975).
21403 U.S.15 (1971).
2r' Er:::noznik had to some extent been qualified by Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). Sec Friedman, Zoning "Adult" Movies: Tbe
Potential Impact of Young v. American Mini Theaters, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1293
(1977); Schauer, Tbe Ret11m of Variable Obscenity? 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1275 (1977).
And both Coben and Ermoznik were called into question on this point by the
Court's reliance on captive audience reasoning in F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation,
438 U.S. 726 (1978). The Court in Pacifica suggested that the distinction may turn
on whether the speech takes place inside or outside the home, id. at 732 n.5. But
by specifically referring to a "balance between the offensive speaker and the unwill-
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Office Departmenf3° and Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights. 31
The Conn did say that time, place, and manner restrictions on
teacher complaints would be permissible and that a violation of such
restrictions by a teacher could constitutionally be cause for dismissaJ.32 In this sense Givhan is based upon impermissible content
regulation, 33 as were both Erznoznik and Chicago Police Department v. Mosley. 34 Just as Mosley suggests that a content-neutral
prohibition on speech near a school would be permissible, so too
does Givhan suggest that the principal could limit the access of
teachers to his office. 35 Only by opening his office to complaints
and then basing his action on the substance of those complaints did
the principal run afoul of the First Amendment. 36 The most relevant
ing audience," ibid. the Court left the entire area of offensive speech and intrusive
speech wide open for further development and clarification. Compare Feinberg,
Pornography and the Criminal Law, 40 U. PnT. L. REv. 567 (1979), witb Schauer,
Pornograpby and the First Amendment, 40 U. PnT. L. REv. 605 (1979); see also
Haiman, Speecb v. Privacy: Is Tbere a Right Not to Be spoken To? 67 Nw. U. L.
REv. 153 (1972); Kaufman, Tbe Medium, tbe Message and the First Amendment,
45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 761 (1970); Rutzick, Offensive Language and tbe Evolution of
First Amendment Pro~ection, 9 HARV. Crv. RTs. Crv. Lm. L. REv. I (!974).
30

397

u.s. 728 (1970).

3 1418

U.S. 298 (1974). As with Coben and Erznoznik, the validity of Lebman
may be in question on other grounds. Lebman is not a content regulation case
only because commercial advertising was not in 1974 held to be within the First
Amendment. Thus, the creation of a forum for commercial advertising would
not then be considered to be the creation of a public forum in First Amendment
terms. But if, as is now the case, commercial advertising is within the First Amendment, it may not be possible to avoid creating a public forum by accepting commercial material.
32 99 S. Ct. at 696 n.4.
33 See TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 672-74 (1978); Karst, Equality
as a Central Principle in tbe First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20 (1976).
34 408 U.S. 92 (1972). See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
The virtually unqualified abhorrence of content regulation in Mosley (sec Karst,
note 33 supra) seems now in decline, a development primarily the product of Mr.
Justice Ste\·en's opinions in Young and Pacifica. This in turn seems consistent with
Mr. Justice Stevens's flexible approach to constitutional adjudication that eschews
distinct categories, rigid rules, and unqualified doctrines. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). It is theoretically possible that
distinguishing among forms of speech will increase the amount of First Amendment protection. Note, Public Figures, Private Figures and Public Interest, 30 STAN.
L. REv. 157, 181 (1977). But the results in Pacifica and Young belie such as possibility.
35
36

99 S. Ct. at 696 n.4.

A school principal who said that his office was off limits might be on safe
constitutional ground. But a principal who totally eliminated access of any kind, by
teachers or parents, might be in difficulty under the Petition Clause of the First
Amendment.
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precedent on this point may be Southeastern Pro111otions, Ltd. v.
Conrad. 37 Chattanooga need not build a civic center, and thus need
not create this particular forum for speech. But having done so it
must treat all speech equally. So too must Leach, having created
this forum by opening his office door, treat all speech equally. The
complainer may not be fired while the apple-polisher is promoted.
A principal could still under some circumstances base a decision,
including a termination decision, on what is said in his office. As
with the teacher who speaks out in public, the teacher who speaks
out in the principal's office is still a teacher. The Pickering balancing
approach rather than the more absolute principles of Mosley provides the framework for the analysis. The principal's voluntary
action in opening his office turns the office into the equivalent of
a public forum, but it does not remove Givhan's status as a teacher.
It does not therefore diminish the extent to which under Pickering
a teacher may still be disciplined or dismissed for speaking out. 38
This approach works, however, only if the forum so created is
indeed a First Amendment forum, notwithstanding its cloistered
location and notwithstanding that the public at large not only was
not invited, but also would not have been permitted entrance. Here
the Court relies on its rejection of the distinction between public
and private speech. Givhan argued that a complaining teacher might
be more prudent in voicing her complaints in the principal's office
than in public. It would be anomalous, she claimed, if the more
prudent action could result in less constitutional protection. 39 This
argument appears to have helped persuade the Court that a distinction between public and. private speech is untenable.
C. A NOVEL SOURCE FOR FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE

My initial remarks about the brevity of the opinion in Givhan
were prompted not so much by the length of the entire opinion as
by the fact that the discussion of the distinction between public
speech and private speech is contained in only three sentences: 40
37 420 U.S. 546 (1975). See Karst, Public Enterprise cmd the Public FoTUm: A
Comme11t 011 Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 37 OHio ST. L.J. 247 (1976).
3
" See text supra, at notes 17 and 23.
3
~ Brieffor Petitioner, at 16-17.
40

99 S. Ct. at 696-97.
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The First Amendment forbids abridgment of the "freedom
of speech." Neither the amendment itself nor our decisions indicate that this freedom is lost to the public employee who arranges to communicate privately with his employer rather
than to spread his views before the public. We decline to adopt
such a view of the First Amendment.
That is it. Nothing about why private communications falls into
the same category as spreading one's views before the public, with
the exception of one rather unusual source for First Amendment
doctrine. The Court looked at and relied on the text of the First
Amendment! 41 In the past the text has hardly been a popular source
for free speech methodology. Of course, most of our First Amendment doctrine is based on the very strong wording of that amendment, but it is rarely suggested that the amendment gives much
guidance to its application in hard cases.42 For that heretofore we
have looked elsewhere.
The Court here uses the text to say that a particular distinction
is untenable. The distinction between public speech and private
speech is indeed not suggested by the words "freedom of speech."
But neither is the distinction between commercial speech and po41 Mr. Justice Rehnquist's punctuation is intriguing to those of us who labor under
the handicap of an exposure to linguistic philosophy. Note that the opinion places
the quotation marks after the word "the," although the words in the First Amendment are "the freedom of speech," not "freedom of speech." The inclusion of the
word "the" allows a wider range of interpretation than would the words "freedom
of speech" standing alone. Mr. Justice Rehnquist's conclusion that the distinction
between public speech and private speech is not supported by the text is buttressed
by his selective extraction of relevant words. Moreover, even the phrase "freedom
of speech" standing alone is far from clear and far from absolute. Sec Schauer,
Speecb and "Speecb": Obscenity and "Obscenity"-an Exercise in tbe Interpretation of Constitlltional Language, 67 GEo. L.J. 899 (1979); Note, Tbe Speecl• mzd
Press Clause of tbe First Amendment as Ordinary Language, 87 HARV. L. REv. 374
(1973).
42
Neither of the two most prominent textual arguments has prevailed. The first
is the Douglas-Black argument for an absolute interpretation of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 143-44 (1959) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting). The other is the textual argument for special protection for the press. See
Lange, Tbe Speecb and Press Clauses, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 77 (1975); Nimmer,
Introduction-Is Freedom of tbe Press a Redundancy: JVbat Does It Add to Freedom of Speecb?, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 639 (1975); Nimmer, Speecb and Press: A Brief
Reply, 23 U.C.L.A. REv. 120 (1975); Stewart, "Or of tbe Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J.
631 (1975); Van Alstyne, Tbe Hazards to tbe Press of Claiming a "Preferred Position," 28 HASTINGS L.J. 761 (1977); see also First National Bank v. Bellotti', 435 U.S.
765 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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litical speech/ 3 the distinction between defamatory speech and nondefamatory speech,44 the distinction between the broadcast media
and other forms of communication,45 or the distinction between
public figures and private individuals/ 6 all distinctions well established in contemporary free speech doctrine. The text tells us only
that the distinction between public speech and private speech is
not supported by the wording of the text. It does not tell us that
the distinction cannot be found in history, in the intent of the drafters, in the philosophical underpinnings of the concept of freedom
of speech, or in the vast realm of constitutional policy. If textual
silence regarding a distinction mandates rejection of that distinction, then free speech theory is in need of a major overhaul. And
if textual silence is not dispositive, then we need to know why the
other sources of First Amendment doctrine do not either command or support this distinction, an inquiry totally absent from the
reasoning in Givhan.
D. A QUESTION OF COVERAGE

The treatment of private speech by the Court becomes more understandable upon closer examination of the opinion of the Fifth
Circuit. The Court of Appeals did not say that Bessie Givhan's
words were not protected by the First Amendment. It said that her
words were not even covered by the First Amendment. 47
This distinction between coverage and protection is of major importance in First Amendment theory. 48 There are some activities
43
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771
n.24 (1976). See Schiro, Connnercial Speecb: Tbe Demise of a Cbimera, 1976
SuPREME CouRT REVIEW 45.
44 Gertz v. Robert \Velch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
4 "F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v.F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
46 Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 u.s. 323 (1974).
·l7 The point is highlighted by the concurring opinion of Judge Roney, in which
he agreed that the error was in even "casting this case in the First Amendment
terms." 555 F.2d at 1322.
4H The distinction has been emphasized primarily by the "definitional balancers,"
who usc the distinction to argue that the First Amendment can be absolute in
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that are totally outside the First Amendment. Such conduct includes
not only a wide range of nonverbal conduct, such as killing, maiming, speeding, and polluting, but also some linguistic or pictorial
conduct, such as verbal betting, price-fixing, acceptance of a contract, extortion, perjury, and hard-core pornography.49 In each of
these instances the conduct at issue, whether verbal or not, is not
taken to be speech in the First Amendment sense, and thus First
Amendment modes of analysis are inappropriate. 50 It is more than
the mere use of words that triggers First Amendment considerations.51 Constitutional law has swallowed enough of the law school
curriculum as it is without having to encompass almost all of contract and commercial law.
The key point here is that conduct that is covered is not necessarily protected. Defamatory speech is covered by the First Amendment, but it is not protected if it is false and if it is published either
negligently, in the case of private individuals, or with knowledge of
falsity, in the case of public figures and public officials. 52 Speech having political content is plainly covered, but it is not protected if it
"is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action." 53 Nonprurient offensive
speech is covered by the First Amendment but is not protected when
terms of protection without being absolute in terms of coverage. See EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM oF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION (1970); Frantz, Tbe First Amendment in tbe
Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Nimmer, Tbe Rigbt to Speak from Times to
Time: First Amendment Tbeory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56
CALIF. L. REv. 935 (1968); Kauper, Book Review, 58 MicH. L. REv. 619 (1960). But
these theories obscure the point that coverage and protection are different even
if protection is not absolute. The distinction shows us that the governmental burden
of justification is higher within the First Amendment arena than outside it, but
it does not command that the burden inside the First Amendment must be insurmountable. See DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 260-61 (1977), in which
Dworkin describes the same distinction as a distinction between the range of a
principle (coverage) and the force of a principle (protection).
49 See

Schauer, note 41 supra.

50 The

First Amendment is of course relevant in drawing the line between that
which is covered and that which is not. This is most apparent in the obscenity cases.
See Schauer, Reflections on "Contemporary Counnunity Standards": Tbe Perpetuation of an Irrelevant Concept in tbe Law of Obscenity, 56 N. CAR. L. REv. I (1978).
51 "[T]he First Amendment ... cannot have been, and obviously was not, intended to give immunity for every possible use of language." Frohwerk v. United
States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) (Holmes, J.).
52

Genz v.RobenWelch, Inc.,418 U.S. 323 (1974).

53

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
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broadcast over the airwaves54 nor protected from content-based zoning regulation. 55 Commercial speech is now covered by the First
Amendment" 0 (although it was not under Valentine v. Chrestenseu),rl1 but it is not protected if false or misleading or deceptive. 5 8
Pickering applies this same analytic structure to public speech
by school teachers. The speech is covered, but it is not protected if
it can be shown to hamper a close working relationship with an immediate supervisor, if it can be shown to call into question the
teacher's competence as a scholar or teacher, if it breaches a legitimate interest in confidentiality, or if it is outweighed by any of
a number of other qualifying factors suggested in Pickering. The
significance of the Fifth Circuit opinion in Givhan is that it does
not treat private speech merely as unprotected. It treats it as not
covered. The First Amendment is not even relevant. The Court of
Appeals could alternatively have said that private speech was covered, but that when presented in this manner and under these circumstances the protection was lost. Indeed, the Supreme Court endorsed such an approach, since it said that the private nature of the
speech might suggest additional factors in applying the "Pickering
calculus."uo
Viewed in this way, the issue is clearly drawn. Is private speech
the type of communication to which the First Amendment is
addressed? It is this question to which the Fifth Circuit loudly answered "No" and to which the Supreme Court more loudly answered "Yes." And it is that "Yes" answer that requires more analysis than is afforded in Givhan.

II. THE PROBLEM OF PRIVATE SPEECH
A. THE MEANING OF "PRIVATE SPEECH"

To weigh the protection afforded to private speech, it is necessary to determine precisely what the Court did and did not hold
4

&

F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).

L~Young

m Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 u.s. 748,762 (1976).
&7 316 u.s. 50 (1942).
&s Sec Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and tbe Regulation of Advertsing, 90 HARY. L. REv. 661 (1977).
w 99 S. Ct. at 696 n.4.
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in Givhan. It is apparent that the Court did not hold that private
speech is per se protected by the First Amendment. There is no
suggestion in Givhan that private speech is more protected than
public speech. In holding that speaking publicly is not a necessary
condition for the First Amendment protection, the Court did not
hold that speaking privately is a sufficient condition.
Since the Court did not hold that private speech is protected by
reason of its privacy, it necessarily did not hold that all private
speech is protected. Those restrictions that are permissible for public speech remain permissible for private speech, except in those
situations where the public nature of the speech provides the justification for the restriction, as with public offensiveness or the provocation of an angry crowd. 60 If I approach an individual whom I
know to be on the verge of committing a political assassination and,
with the intent of causing that assassination, specifically urge him
to carry out his plan, then this private speech may be punished just as
could public counseling of murder in circumstances where it is
likely that murder will immediately ensue.
What the Court did hold in Givhan is that private speech is not
for that reason alone excluded from either the coverage or the protection of the First Amendment. If a certain form of speech would
be protected if delivered in print, or to a public audience, then that
same speech is equally protected if spoken or published in a closed
office, in a living room, or at a table in a quiet restaurant. This implies that the distinction between public speech and private speech
is never relevant in First Amendment adjudication, an implication
that derives much support from the unqualified nature of the Court's
opinion as well as from the Court's statement that the lack of such
a distinction is derived directly from the text of the First Amendment.
Several unexplained distinctions serve to obscure the Court's conclusions about private speech. Thus, the public-private distinction
discussed here is not the same as the distinction between speech that
is in the public interest and speech that concerns only the private
personal interests of the speaker or the listener. vVe are not dis6
°Crowd reaction may be relevant whether the crowd is sympathetic or hostile.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Fcin.er v. New York, 340 U.S. 315
(I 951). There may not be much left ofF einer. Smith v. Collin, 436 U.S. 953 (1978);
Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. Ill (1969); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229
(1963).
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cussing private speech in the sense in which Meiklejohn distinguished private speech from public speech. 61 The issue here and in
Givbmz involves the forum and the audience, not the subject matter. Bessie Givhan's complaints plainly related both to the operation of the public schools and to race relations in a community in
which satisfactory race relations were vitally important. However
narrowly one wishes to define the notion of "speech in the public
interest," the speech in Givban is undoubtedly included.62 The holding in Givban does not support the conclusion that the same result
might have been reached if Bessie Givhan devoted her time in the
principal's office to spreading rumors about the private behavior
of mutual acquaintances. 63
Any distinction between public or important speech and private
or trivial speech may be unworkable. 64 There is certainly such a
suggestion in the rejection of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, bzc. 65 by
Gertz v. Robert TVelcb, Inc. 66 But the impact of Gertz on this issue
is lessened not only by Time, Inc. v. Firestone61 but also by Young
tll i\IEJKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH A1'.'D ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948);
Meiklejohn, Tbe First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SuPREME CouRT REVIEW
245. For similar distinctions, sec Be Vier, Tbe First Amendment and Political
Speecb: An Inquiry into tbe Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REv.
299 (1978); Bark, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
1No.L.J.1 (1971).
2
'' 1ndccd, the firing of Bessie Givhan for complaining may not be all that dis:
similar to a prosecution for sedition. The ultimate question is the value of loyalty,
whether to a nation or to an employer. See Kalven, The New York Times Case:
A Note on "Tbe Cemral ,Ueaning of tbe First Amendment," 1964 SuPREME CoURT
REVIEW 191.
ll3 I am not saying that such a distinction could be supported by current doctrine,
only that Gh:bcm itself stands as no barrier to the adoption or application of this
type of distinction.

ct Sec Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speecb and First Amendment Metbodology, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 915,936 (1978); see also Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARV.
L. REV. 891 (1949).
66 418U.S.323 (1974).
c:;403 U.S.29 (1971).
11
7424 U.S. 448 (1976). The import of Time is that at least some degree of legitimate public importance is part of the determination of who is a public figure. It
is arguably beyond the human capacity to comprehend all of the different ways
in which the Supreme Court has used the word "public." Since "private" is the
most obvious antonym for "public," it is not surprising to find the varying use of
that word as well.
There is a similar distinction embodied in the "newsworthiness" standard applied
in actions for invasion of privacy. See Kalven, Tbe Reasonable Man and tbe First
Amendment: Hill, Butts, and JValker, 1967 SuPREME CoURT REviEW 267, 283. Although the Supreme Court has yet to speak to the constimtionality of a true (as
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v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. 68 "[F]ew of us would march our
sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see
'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theaters of our
choice."69 But the theoretical wisdom or practical workability of
distinctions like this is not at issue here. The subject matter of
Givhan's speech did pertain to public issues, and this sense of the
public-private distinction is not what is involved in Givhan.
Exclusion of the subject-matter sense of "private" still leaves several different concepts of private speech. One is the distinction between face-to-face communication and less personal forms of
speech. In upholding constitutional protection for client solicitation by lawyers in In re Priums70 and denying such protection in
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,71 the Court drew some support from the presence of "in-person" solicitation in Obralik, a
factor absent in Priums. 72 The Court suggests that in-person solicitation might either be less central to the purposes of the First Amendment or at least more susceptible to abuse. But the letter in Obralik
is also directed to one person only and is as much if not mar~ inaccessible to the public at large. Thus it is hard to see how Obralik and
Primus can tum on a public-private distinction, although in-person
communication is one of the earmarks of the type of speech at issue
in Givhan. Mr. Justice Rehnquists's dissent in Primus questions the
distinction between face-to-face and other forms of communication, 73 and there may be a relationship between this dissent and his
opinion in Givhan. But the concurrence of the entire Court in
Gi-vhan leads to the conclusion that the rejection of the publicprivate distinction there leaves the distinction between in-person
and more distant speech intact.
Alternatively, private speech may be taken to mean speech directed to only one person, rather than to a group, or to the general
public, or to anyone who cares to listen. Speech that is private in
this sense would include both face-to-face communication and a
opposed to false-light) privacy case, the newsworthiness standard has proYided the
relevant distinction in most such cases in the lower courts. See, e.g., Briscoe "·
Reader's Digest Association, 4 Cal .3d 529 (1971).
68

427U.S.50 (1976).

69

/d. at 70; see also id. at 61.

70 436U.S.412
73

(1978).

7

1436 u.s. 447 (1978).

72

436 U.S. at 445 (Rehnquist, ]., dissenting).

I d. at 464-66.
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personal letter, but would exclude a speech to a large audience, a
mass mailing, or the publication of a book, newspaper, or magazine.
Such a distinction is suggested by the current formulation of the
"fighting words" doctrine. 74 The Court has strongly implied that
the crucial demarcation between regulable fighting words and protected inflammatory words is the extent to which the former are
directed at particular individuals. 75 Standing on a platform and proclaiming that all police officers are pigs is protected, even if a police
officer is in the audience. 76 But yelling "You're a pig!" to a particular officer may be the subject of prosecution. 77 Although Paul
Cohen has the right to wear a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the
Draft," 78 he may not have the right to say "Fuck you!" to a particular individual.
To the extent that Givban's rejection of the public-private distinction can be interpreted as a rejection of a distinction between
speech directed to the public at large and speech directed at a particular individual, this aspect of the fighting words cases is called
into question. This is an issue to which I will return later, since a
distinguishing principle seems available. 79 There is less question about
the effect on another area of First Amendment doctrine. The holding in Givba11 certainly casts grave doubts on the extent to which the
principles of Gertz v. Robert Welcb, Inc. are limited to publications by the media. Such a limitation is supported by the Court's repeated references to the mass media in the Gertz opinion. 80 Anum74 Sec, e.g., Gooding v. \:Vilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408
U.S. 901 (1972); Lewis v. New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913 (1972); Brown v. Oklahoma,
408 U.S. 914 (1972); Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Plummer v. City
of Columbus, 414 U.S. 2 (I 973). The Courr's cryptic decisions in these cases, generally on overbreadth or vagueness grounds, make it difficult to say whether or
not there is anything worrhy of dte title "doctrine." See TRIBE, note 33 supra, at
617-18.
7"
711

Gooding v. \:Vi !son, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914 (1972).

7 7 Sec

Cincinnati v. Karlan, 39 Ohio St.2d 107 (1974).
7fl Cohen\', California, 403 U.S.15 (1971).
70

Sec text infra, at note 103.
See Shitfrin, supra note 64; 9<>1lins & Drushal, Tbe Reaction of tbe State Courts
to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 28 CAsE WEST. RES. L. REv. 306, 328-34 (1978);
Eaton, Tbe American Law of Defamation tbrougb Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REv. 1349, 1403-08, 1416-19 (1975);
Note, First Amendment Protection agaimt Libel Actiom: Distinguisbing Media
mzd Non-Media Defendants, 47 So. CAL. L. REv. 902 (1974) (written before Gertz).
80

234

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[1979

ber of lower courts that have been called upon to apply Gertz to
nonmedia speech have in fact held Gertz inapplicable. 81 Recent decisions of the Supreme Court negate the notion that Gertz applies
only to the organized press. 82 A majority of the Court has consistently refused to distinguish between the press and other forms
of communication, and one can say with a fair degree of confidence
that this same majority would apply Gertz to public orations as
well as to printed or broadcast publications. 83 But speech directed
to a limited number of identified individuals is more problematic.
What if A tells B that C is having an affair with D's wife? The implication in Givhan is that this is subject to the same protection as
would obtain if A's charges against C were published in the New
York Times or announced on the Boston CommonY· The resolution of this lingering issue in the law of defamation may or may
not have been the Court's oblique intention, but it is quite likely
that that is the result.
A distinction between public speech and private speech may instead (or in addition) be a distinction based on the location of the
speech. Some speech takes place in cloistered locations, such as living
rooms or private offices. Other speech is more open, taking place
in the streets, the parks, or the mass media. The Court does not
make clear in Gi-vhan whether the speech was private in the sense
that it was directed only to the principal or in the sense that it was
made in the principal's closed office. It is likely but not certain that
the Court rejected both distinctions.
Both the audience-directed and location-directed notions of
private speech turn on the concept of who is invited. 85 A meeting
81
E.g., compare Calero v. Del Chemical Corp., 68 Wis.2d 487 (1975), witb Jacron
Sales Co. v.Sindorf, 276 Md. 580 (1976).
82
This conclusion is drawn from the Court's refusal to recognize a distinct
privilege for the press, often on the grounds that no distinguishing features can be
developed in any principled manner. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); Houchins v. KQED, Inc:,
438 U.S. 1 (1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Sax be"· ·washington Post
Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
83 See Eaton, note 80 supra, at 1406.
84
It is true that this hypothetical case involves speech that is purely private in
the subject-matter sense. But there is absolutely no suggestion in Gertz that the
constitutionalized negligence requirement would not apply to all mass media
defamation regardless of subject matter.
85 If I have a conversation with a friend in my living room, it is private in that
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of the American Bar Association from which the press is excluded
is in both senses private, although the audience could be large. The
speaker knows the identity of the audience and can also limit the
audience.
This suggests that privacy as used here is a complex rather than a
simple notion. Its very complexity may suggest a rejection of the
public-private distinction on pragmatic rather than theoretical
grounds.86 It is perhaps best to look at private speech in the context
of a paradigm example. In all senses other than the subject-matter
sense the truly private speech is a two-person face-to-face conversation in a private living room closed to everyone except the two
panicipants. If we can say that this speech is within the First Amendment, then we can say that forms of speech in some sense less
private are within the First Amendment as well.
B. THE VALUE OF PRIVATE SPEECH

Unraveling the different senses of a distinction between public
speech and private speech helps in understanding the import of
Gi-vhan and in applying it to other situations. It remains, however,
to examine the Coun's conclusion that the distinction is not relevant.
Does speech that is private in some or all senses have less First
Amendment value?
A distinction between public speech and private speech in the
extent of either coverage or protection is least justified under a First
Amendment theory derived in whole or in pan from some concept
of democracy or self-government. The Meiklejohn theory is the
most famous, 87 although it is neither the first nor the only anicula-

no one else is invited into my lh·ing room to participate. But if I have the conversation with the same friend on a bench in a park, the conversation is every bit as
private e\·cn though the location is in some senses public. But the important fact
is that the com·ersation is private in either case. It is in all cases restricted to the
participants, whether by reason of the laws of pri,·atc property or by reason of the
fact that we will stop talking if anyone comes too close. Aficionados of bad movies
or television police shows know that if you want to take out a contract on someone you do not do it in a prh·ate house; you do it in a public park. Privacy may
be created by crowds or by anonymity as much as by seclusion. It all depends on
what you mean by "private," and the Court in Givban docs not tell us what it
means.
" 0 Sec Shiffrin, note 64 supra.
x7 Sec note 61 supra.
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tion of such a theory. 88 Under any such theory it is difficult to distinguish between speech in public and speech in private. As much as
we may talk about the public forum, we must not avoid recognizing that a great deal of political speech takes place outside of the
public forum. To find the "true" forum for political discussion and
commentary in this country, we should not journey to the theaters,
the parks, or the streets, or read newsapers, magazines, placards,
posters, or billboards. Rather, we must go to the pool halls, the
factories, the bars, the private offices, the barbershops, and the proverbial living room in Peoria. Although many of these are "public"
places, they are all locations where particular conversations are
limited to a known, invited, and usually quite small audience. But
it is here that politics and public matters are discussed and minds
are changed. It is here that arguments about politics and personalities take place.
The public forum is indeed the catalyst for much discussion of
public matters. But the public forum is not the end of the process.
The culmination of the process is to be found in the discussion
among people in much more cloistered settings. The town meeting
model so stressed by Meiklejohn relies on dialogue and participation.
To see that process outside of the New England town meeting we
should look at a forum for discussion and argument, not a forum
for unilateral speechmaking and passive listening. This forum for
discussion and argument is much more likely to be limited rather
than open to all. It may be one sign of a totalitarian society that
people are imprisoned for what they say in public, especially if they
are criticizing government, its policies, or its leaders. 80 But the
ultimate affront to the notion of a free society occurs when people
are imprisoned for what they say in their living rooms. "\Ve are in
danger when the informer is one member of a large audience, but
we are in greater danger when the informer is our next-door
neighbor.
From this perspective, we can see that the rejection of the public88 See KANT, ON THE Ow SAw: THAT MAY BE RIGHT IN THEORY BUT IT WoN'T
WoRK IN PRAcriCE 72 (E. B. Ashton trans. 1974); SPINOZA, TRAcrATUS THEOLOGICOPouncus chap. 20 (1670); Burne, Of tbe Liberty of tbe Press, in EssAYS, MoRAL,
PoLITICAL AND LITERARY 8 (Oxford ed. 1963); see also Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254
U.S. 325, 337-38 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
89 See Kalven, note 69 supra.
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private distinction is also supported by the "self-expression" 90 and
"catharsis" 01 values often said to justify the principles of freedom
of speech. It may be that free speech theories derived from the concept of the marketplace of ideas, 02 or the search for truth, 93 or the
principles of self-government, 04 are theories derived from societal
rather than individual interests. 05 They are directed more toward
the interests of society, and also to the interests of the listeners, than
they are toward the interests of the speaker. Under such theories
we protect speakers only instrumentally in the service of these
broader interests. From this point of view one can imagine granting less protection to private speech, since the closed setting reduces the number of listeners and thereby reduces the impact on
society at large. But if, instead, we look at free speech as providing
a catharsis, an outlet for frustration short of violence, then we should
acknowledge that this may occur as easily with private speech as
with public speech.
Similarly, if we look to the value to the speaker of communicating ideas to others, then the size or location of the audience may
again be of little importance. Indeed, the value to the speaker may
be increased as the size of the audience and the openness of the location decrease. Although self-expression in general is not a First

Bo See, e.g., TnmE, note 33 supra at 576-736; Dworkin, Introduction, in DwoRKIN,
Eo., PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 1, 13-16 (1977); Baker, Scope of tbe First Amendment
Freedom of Speecb, 25 U.CL.A. L. REv. 964 (1978); Richards, Free Speecb and
Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Tbeory of tbe First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L.
REv. 45 (1974).
01
See, e.g., Emerson, Toward a General Tbeory of tbe First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877, 884 (1963); LASKI, A GRA;>.IMAR oF PoLITics, 121 (4th ed. 1938).

02
See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616,630 (1919) (Holmes,]., dissenting).
03 MILL, On Liberty, in EssENTIAL WoRKS OF JoHN STUART MILL 268-304 (Lerner
ed. 1961); MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 78, 126 (Suffolk ed. 1968); LoCKE, A LETTER coNCERNING ToLERATION 151 (Gough ed. 1948); Bagehot, Tbe Metapbysical Basis of
Toleration, in 2 LITERARY STUDIES 422, 425 (Hutton ed., 3d ed., 1884); Jefferson,
First Inaugural Address, in THE CoMPLETE }EFFERSON 384 (Padover ed. 1943);
United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (L. Hand, J.);
See Gunther, Learned Hand and tbe Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine:
Some Fragment)· of History, 27 STAN. L. REv. 719 (1975).

04
05

See notes 61 and 86 supra.

On this distinction in the context of freedom of speech, see 3 PoUND, }URISPRUDENCE 63-67,313-17 (1959).
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Amendment value, 96 self-expression by communication has been so
regarded in numerous opinions of the Supreme Court.97 And so long
as this value remains as one core of free speech theory, then it follows that the interests of the speaker are independently deserving
of First Amendment protection. When we focus on the interests
of the speaker, it is difficult to say that these interests are necessarily
diminished by the smallness or seclusion of the audience.
Moreover, there may be societal or listener interests even where
there is an individual listener receiving the message other than in
the public forum. One of the values of freedom of speech is its
function in helping to correct and challenge accepted beliefs. 98 This
is a value that obtains under both the self-government and marketplace-of-ideas arguments. Here the proper focus is on the identity
of the listener rather than the number of listeners. Criticism of the
President of the United States does more than allow the populace
to remove or fail to reelect an unsatisfactory President. It does more
than mobilize public opinion in such a way that the President may
respond with deeds or reply with words. There is a more direct
argument. Criticism of the President is valuable because the President himself may hear the particular criticism and may as a result
modify or reject an erroneous policy.
From this perspective the Free Speech Clause merges with the
First Amendment right to petition the government for a redress of
grievances. One of the amicus briefs in Givhan relied as much on
the right to petition the government as it did on freedom of speech.99
96

See Schauer, note 41 supra.

97

See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777, 783 (1978);
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.64, 74-75 (1964).
98 See PoPPER, THE OPEN SociETY AND hs ENEMIES (5th ed. 1966). A forceful
criticism of Mill and Popper is Kendall, Tbe "Open Society" and Its Fallacies, H
A..~.PoL.Sct.REv.972 (1960).
99
Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Association of University Professors, at
15-20. See also Brief for Petitioner, at 19 n.14. The relationship between the Free
Speech Clause and the Petition Clause was suggested by Justice Rutledge in Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,530 (1945). This is particularly interesting here because some
of the activities in Tbomas could be characterized as "private" solicitation. The
Court recognized that private solicitation of a single individual might create different issues, id. at 528-29, and used the combination of the Free Speech and Petition Clauses to suggest that private solicitation would be for one reason or another
protected by the First Amendment. I d. at 533-34.
The right to petition plainly encompasses administrative bodies as well as legislative ones. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508,
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The argument also has some textual support. Because it is impossible to petition the government for a redress of grievances without
at the same time speaking, the Petition Clause would be a redundancy if it did not give particular protection for direct criticism of
public officials, without regard to whether the criticism is made by
public speech, private letter, or private audience. 100 The Free Speech
Clause protects my right to stand in Lafayette Park and announce
that the President and his policies are demented. It may be the Petition Clause that gives me the right to write him a letter containing
the same message.
Regardless of whether the source is the Free Speech Clause or the
Petition Clause, it would certainly be odd if some part of the First
Amendment101 did not protect the right to criticize a governmental
official to his face. Private communication with an officer of government may in many respects be the most effective way of calling
that officer to task or pointing out mistakes in judgment that can
be corrected. The more the Court continues to rely on arguments
about democracy to support the concept of freedom of speech/02
the more it can be said that direct criticism of public officials lies
at the core of First Amendment theory. And, as we increasingly
identify this as a core free speech value, a blanket exclusion of
private speech appears ever more anomalous.
Of course, there may in many instances be advantages in the kind
of public speech that is directed to a large and possibly anonymous

510 0972). The Petition Clause has been used on numerous occasions in the lower
courts to overrurn discharges of complaining employees. See, e.g., Jackson v.
United States, 428 F.2d 844 (Ct. CI. 1970); Swaaley v. United States, 376 F.2d 857,
861 (Ct. Cl. 1967); ]annetta v. Cole, 493 F.2d 1334, 1337 n.5 (4th Cir. 1974); Los
Angeles Teachers Union v. Los Angeles City Board of Education, 455 P.2d 827,
832 (1969).
100
Direct communication has frequently been considered to be the special concern of the Petition Clause. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 828--29 n.6 (1974);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 302-03 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
101
The Court has frequently relied on the connection between the Free Speech
and Petition Clauses to hold that conduct is protected by one, the other, or both.
Sec United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967);
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
530-31 ( 1945).
102
Sec Brennan, Tbe Supreme Court and tbe Meiklejo/m Interpretation of tbe
First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REv. I (1965); Polsby, Buckley v. Valco: Tbe
Speci.Tl Nature of Political Speecb, 1976 SuPREME CouRT REviEW 1.
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group. It is a mistake to assume that there is only one core to First
Amendment theory. Freedom of speech is more properly regarded
as a bundle of different but interrelated concepts, joined together
under the oversimplifying rubric of "freedom of speech." One core
value of the First Amendment is personal or face-to-face criticism
of public officials. But this does not exclude as another core value the
right to stand in the public forum, or the right to publish criticism
of government for public consumption. The soapbox, the parade,
the demonstration, the newspaper, the book, and the magazine all
occupy special places in our society, places recognized as special
by contemporary First Amendment doctrine. These are all forms
of "mass" speech, and their effectiveness increase in direct proportion to the size of the audience.
To the extent that free speech is a societal rather than an individual interest, forms of speech that reach large segments of society
may have advantages not possessed by speech that is private in
the sense now under discussion. But merely because public speech
is in some respects more important than private speech does not
mean that in other respects private speech may not be equally if not
more important. As long as we realize that free speech is more than
one concept, these two positions are not inconsistent. Since the
value of public speech may be derived in large part from the private
speech that it provokes and fosters, a theory that places public
speech above private speech in the First Amendment hierarchy is
on shaky ground indeed.
The foregoing lends support to the conclusion that the Court
was correct in saying that the private context of the speech did not
dispose of Gi-vhan (and this is all the Court decided) and to the
corollary conclusion that Gertz cannot be limited to the mass media.
But what then of the .fighting words cases, where a similar distinction seems established? The answer seems to come from an examination of the other side of the First Amendment question. On the
one hand, we look at the value of the particular speech or at the
value of a particular category of speech. But on the other hand,
we look at the justifications for the asserted restriction. In developing categories and approaches to First Amendment analysis, we
look at the interests in regulation as well as the interests in free
speech. From this vantage point we see in Ohralik the interest in
preventing potentially coercive and misleading solicitation. In many
cases we look at the interests in public order and safety that justify
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content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations. 103 In the fighting words case we look at the interest in preventing "idea-less"
provocation. 104
In all of these situations it is the context of speech that governs
its regulability. The justification for regulation in these and other
situations depends on the context in which the speech exists. This
is not the place to analyze each instance of permissible regulation
of speech in which the extent of that permission varies with the context. The important point is that there are such instances, although
they do not exhaust the category of permissible restrictions.105 In
those instances in which context is established as being the relevant
or dispositive factor it would be foolish to say that context may be
considered but that the public or private nature must be ignored.
The location of the speech may very well give the speech the impact
that justifies its regulation. So too with the size of the audience.
In the fighting words cases the "privateness" increases the impact of
the very factor that justifies the regulation. Private verbal assaults
are more likely to provoke violent reactions. 106 The distinction between public speech and private speech may indeed be relevant in
determining the extent of protection where the principles that permit regulation would, without the public-private distinction, allow
a consideration of context. The private context, as has been seen,
cannot create the justification. But where the principles of regulation lead us to context, the location of the speech and the identity of
the audience are factors to be considered. This conclusion is supported by the Court's observation that under some circumstances
the setting may be relevant to the "Pickering calculus," 107 but the
principles extend far beyond Pickering alone.
In some instances of regulation justified by context the private
103
See, e.g., KO\•acs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U.S.569 (1941).
104

See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
Permissible restrictions on defamatory speech, e.g., are largely independent
of context.
Ir•J The more the speec:h is directed at a particular individual, the more he is
likely ro react violently. But it is possible that, once the speech is directed at a particular individual, the likelihood of violent reaction increases with the number
of observers. Part of the cause of violent reaction may very well be humiliation,
which requires an audience.
10
:;

107

99 S. Cr. ar 696 n.4.
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setting may argue for increased protection. This may be the case
in Givhan, for the private audience may produce better results with
fewer unpleasant side effects. And in Pickering the Court suggested
that under some circumstances a teacher might be required to make
a complaint internally before going public with the complaint.108
But instances also exist where it is possible that the private setting
may decrease the available protection. Fighting words again seem
the best example.
With this vital qualification regarding context, we can both justify and qualify the holding in Givhan. The private setting alone
does n:ot result in forfeiture of First Amendment coverage or protection, but the private setting is indeed relevant to the extent of
protection where the extent of protection is to be determined by the
context of the utterance at issue.

III.

THE PRIVATE CITIZEN AND THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE

We have seen several senses of the public-private distinction,
one in terms of subject matter, another in terms of the forum, and
a third in terms of the audience. But there is still another sense, one
that leads to a consideration of the other important facet of Givhan.
For Bessie Givhan was not only a private citizen; she was also a
public employee. Pickering was decided in large part in reliance on
the fact that Pickering was speaking out not as a public employee
but as a private citizen.109 The same is true of both the situation
and the Court's opinions in Perry, 110 in Mt. Healthy, 111 and in City
of Madison, Joint School District No. 8 v. ·wisconsin Employment
Relations Commission. 112 In all of these cases it could as easily have
been a private citizen not employed by the State who was speaking.
These cases leave undecided the extent of free speech protection
where the individual speaks not qua citizen but qua public employee.
Givhan is far from illuminating on this issue, but it provides some
signposts for exploring this difficult constitutional terrain.
The cases before Givhan all involve speech in forums open to the
108

391 U.S. at 572 n.4.
!d. at 574, noting that the employment "is only tangentially and insubstantially
involved in the subject matter of the public communication made by a teacher."
109

110
111

408 U.S. at 598.
429U.S.at282.

112

429U.S.l67 (1976).
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general public. In each case the Court took pains to point out that
it was the teacher as citizen that provided the focal point of the analysis. "He addressed the school board not merely as one of its employees but also as a concerned citizen, seeking to express his views
on an important decision of his government." 113 This language
would clearly have been controlling in Givhan if Bessie Givhan's
complaints about racial discrimination in the schools had been expressed in a letter to the editor of a local newspaper, in a speech in
a public park, or at a board of education meeting open to the general public. 114 But by expressing her complaints in the principal's
office, she utilized a forum not open to the general public. It was
open to her solely by virtue of her employment as a teacher.
\Vhen a teacher or other public employee speaks out as a teacher,
or as a public employee, additional considerations come into play,
some of which were suggested in Pickering. 115 The speech may
jeopardize a necessarily close working relationship, it may breach
a valid interest in confidentiality, or it may call into question a
teacher's very fitness for the position. I have the right to believe that
the world is flat or that astrology tells us more than the theories of
Newton and Einstein. I also have the right to express these views to
anyone foolish enough to listen. But if I am the head of the physics
department at a major state research university, I can hardly deny
that such public utterances might validly cause my superiors to
wonder if perhaps I am in the wrong line of work and to take appropriate action. As a citizen I have the right to interest myself in
and comment upon the fortunes of the New Yark Yankees. But
as a teacher of constitutional law I do not have the right to devote
my entire course in constitutional law to evaluating the performances of Reggie Jackson and Ron Guidry in the 197 8 World Series.
It is this latter situation that more closely relates to the facts in
Givban. Bessie Givhan was not only speaking out as a teacher, she
113

/J. at 174-75.
In City of Madison it was the fact that the meeting was open to the public
rather than a closed bargaining session that was determinative. Ibid.
115
"At the same time it cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those
it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.
The problem in any case is to arriYe at a balance between the interests of the
teacher, as citizen, in commentinl? upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, m promoting the efficiency of the public services
it performs through its employees." 391 U.S. at 568.
1H
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was speaking out on her employer's premises and on her employer's
time. Regardless of whether a modem-day McAuliffe might have
the right to talk politics on his own time, 116 it is clear that he
could be legitimately dismissed for delivering a political oration
when he was supposed to be directing traffic.
Transposing this to the academic setting, we can see that virtually
all of the Supreme Court's references to academic freedom have
been little more than excess verbiage. In the most prominent "academic freedom" cases, from Keyishian v. Board of Regems117 and
vVieman ·v. Updegraff118 to Pickering and Perry, the speech rook
place outside of the school and on the teacher's own time. These
are not academic freedom cases-they are free speech cases. The issue is only whether a public employee can be penalized for exercising a citizen's right of free speech. The full application of the principle in these cases to public employees who are not teachers
demonstrates that the principle is only that dismissal from public employment is just one of many impermissible penalties on protected
speech. m If it is academic freedom that protects a teacher's right
to join an organization, or speak out in public, then one who is not
an academic has no claim to such rights. Surely this is not true.
Pickering's right to criticize the school board is no greater than the
streetcleaner's right to criticize the sanitation department. 120
116
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216 (1892) (Holmes, J.).
"The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." ld. at 220. The accepted wisdom is that
McAuliffe is the prototypical example of the now discredited right-privilege distinction. See Van Alstyne, Tbe Demise of tbe Rigbt-Privilege Distinction in Constitutirmal Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968). But McAuliffe might not necess:1rily be
decided differently today. See Civil Service Commission v. National Association
of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S.
75 (1947).
117

385 u.s. 589 (1967).

118

344 U.S. 183 (1952). See also Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Fellman, Academic Freedom in American Law,
1961 Wis. L. REv. 3; Jones, Tbe American Concept of Academic Freedom, in
JouGHIN, ED., AcADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE 224 (1967); .i'vlurphy, Academic
Freedom-an Emerging Constitutional Rigbt, 28 L. & CoNT. PRoB. 447 (1963); V:1n
Alstyne, Tbe Constitutional Rigbts of Teacbers and Professors, 1970 DuKE L.J. 841;
Wright, Tbe Constitution on tbe Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027 (1969); Schauer,
Scbool Books, Lesson Plans, and tbe Constitution, 78 W.VA. L. REv. 287 (1976).
119 See O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: TVelfare Benefits witb Strings Attacbed, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 443 (1966); Van Alstyne, Tbe Constitutional Rigbts of
Employees: A Comment on tbe Inappropriate Uses of an Old Analogy, 16 U.C.L.A.

L. REV. 751 (1969).
120

On applications of Pickering to nonacademic positions, sec, e.g., Don:1hue
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Talk of academic freedom is therefore pointless unless there is
something about academic freedom that is special or different. Academic freedom is a meaningful concept only if it protects activities
not otherwise protected by the general concept of free speech. 121
Unless academic freedom adds something to freedom of speech its
deployment serves only to confuse the analysis.
lf there is an independent concept of academic freedom, it is
surely derived not only from the First Amendment, in general, but
also from the doctrine of freedom of speech, in particular. Yet this
does not mean that the two are the same. The values of the intellectual marketplace and of open inquiry into even the most accepted
beliefs are arguably served in a special way within the setting of an
academic institution. It can also be said that the academic institution has a special responsibility to instill the spirit of inquiry that
enables the general notion of free speech to function. If this is true,
then the First Amendment may generate a distinct institutional protection for the academy.
Drawing this distinction makes it possible to see Givhan in a different light. Prior to Givhan there had been only one "true" academic freedom case in the Supreme Court, Sweezy v. New Hampshire.122 vVithout the concept of academic freedom there is nowhere
in constitutional law an exception to the principle that during working hours employees are to do what their employers tell them to
do. But in Sr..veezy the Court suggested that activities in the classroom might be protected, a seeming exception to this general principle. After Sweezy, the State as employer is to some extent limited
in the extent to which it can mandate what the university teacher
as employee can do in the classroom. But this is a somewhat obscure

v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1972) (chaplain at mental hospital); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex rei. Rafferty v. Philadelphia Psychiatric Center, 356 F.
Supp. 500 <E.D. Pa. 1973) (psychiatric nurse); )annetta v. Cole, 493 F.2d 1334 (4th
Cir. 1974) (fireman). In Rafferty the court suggested that, if the plaintiff's superiors
in the community mental health center were that sensitive to criticism, they perhaps
ought to be the patients rather than the supervisors.
121 By far the best exposition of this distinction is Van Alstyne, Tbe Specific
Tbeory of Academic Freedom and tbe General Issue of Civil Liberties, 404 ANNALS
140 (1972).
122 3H U.S. 234 (1957), in which a state investigation into a lecture delivered
in a class at the University of New Hampshire was held invalid. Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), involved classroom activity, but the case was decided
on establishment of religion grounds. Mr. Justice Stewart's concurrence did suggest a possible academic freedom-free speech path to the same result. Id. at 116.
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dictum in Sweezy, and there has been little more guidance from
the Supreme Court.123
The paucity of precedent has not deterred the proliferation of
an extensive literature on this subject.124 There have been several
notable lower court cases, most prominently Judge Johnson's opinion in Parducci v. Rutland. 125 But the Supreme Court has said very
little about the extent to which either academic freedom or freedom
of speech protects utterances on school time and on school property.
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Coumnmity Scbool District/26 the Court said that " [i] t can hardly be argued that either
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate," 127 but the Court there
did little more than protect only those exercises of constitutiol}al
rights that are not inconsistent with the educational function. It
said nothing about whether freedom of speech is part of the educational function.
To answer this question it is necessary to look closely at the educational process. This is a task that is not manageable here and
would be quite far afield from what can be gleaned from Givban.
There is also the independent and equally difficult question whether
the recognition of such a distinct institutional right can be found
in the First Amendment and, also, whether its recognition would be

123
Two additional cases are helpful. In Healy Y. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81
(1972), it was suggested that the classroom was a marketplace of ideas. And in
Regents of the University of California Y. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), i\lr. Justice
Powell talked of academic freedom: "Academic freedom, though not a specifically
enumerated constitutional right, long has been Yiewed as a special concern of the
First Amendment. The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to
education includes the selection of its student body." 438 U.S. at 312. Since the
selection of students is not speech, Mr. Justice Powell's opinion goes a long way
toward recognizing that academic freedom protects acth·ities not otherwise protected by the concept of free speech.
124
In addition to the authorities cited at note 118 supra, see Goldstein, Tbe Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to Determine TVbat Tbey
Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1293 (1976); Miller, Teachers' Freedom of Expressiou
withiu the Classroom: A Search for Staudards, 8 GA. L. REv. 837 (1974); Nahmod,
Coutroversy in the Classroom: The High School Teacher and Freedom of Expression, 39 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 1032 (1971); Note, Academic Freedom i11 tbe Public
Schools: The Right to Teacb, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1176 (1973).
125
316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970). See also Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359
(1st Cir. 1969); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass. 1971), aff'd, 448
F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971).

126

393 U.S. 503 (1969).

127

/d. at 506.
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consistent with the Court's rejection of independent institutional
rights for the organized press. 128 But if there is such an independent
concept of academic freedom, a freedom to teach or to choose class
materials, it arguably varies with the type and level of education
involved. 12° For central to the recognition of classroom academic
freedom is acceptance of the classroom as more of a public forum
than a state-controlled agency for indoctrination. It is not at all unreasonable to suggest that the classroom shifts from indoctrinative to
exploratory with the increasing age and sophistication of the students.
But Givhan is not a classroom case. It must not be read to suggest
that Bessie Givhan's complaints are to be tolerated if she uses the
classroom rather than the principal's office as the forum for her
grievances. Givhan is the intermediate case, dealing with speech
out of the classroom but in the school and on school time. 130 In holding that this was indeed a forum for speech activities, the Court
goes at least pan of the way toward recognizing an independent
concept of academic freedom. Albeit obliquely, it suggests as well
that the internal critic has a constitutionally protected position.
Various theories might support these conclusions. First, there is ·
the very real problem in government that critics may be singled
out for especially unfavorable treatment. In protecting the internal
critic, the gadfly, the Court partially commits itself to a philosophy
of workplace democracy. Harmony, uniformity, and obedience
may not be the only important values in public employment. The
marketplace of ideas is moved from the public forum into the working environment and the employment relationship. This is again
quite far from most of the commonly accepted core principles of
freedom of speech. But as a question of policy there is much to
commend such a theory. If our assumptions about the value of
criticism and the value of free interchange of ideas are justified, then
those assumptions apply with special force to those, such as em-

1

~'

12

Sec notes 42 and 82 supra.

°Compare

De1.•e/opmems in tbe Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REv.
101-5, 1053 (1968); Schauer, note 118 supra; and Goldstein, note 124 supra, witb
Note, note 12+ supra, and Le Clerscq, Tbe Monkey Laws and tbe Public Scbools:
A Seco11d Cmmmzption, 27 VAND. L. REv. 209,235 (1974).
13
°For such intermediate cases, sec, e.g., Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir.
1972); \Vhitscl "·Southeast Local School District, 48f F.2d 1222 (6th Cir. 1973).
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ployees, who have a particular expertise and a particular concern
with the matters at hand. Reference to this special expertise is found
in Pickering as wel1. 131 But let there be no mistake. The constitutionalization of the workplace makes it clear, as the procedural due
process cases had done earlier, that public employment and private
employment are becoming increasingly dissimilar.
This constitutionalized openness may inure to the benefit of the
public in several ways. Not only may it be said that the public benefits when institutions are structured on more open lines, but the
public may also benefit more directly when public employees can
inform the electorate about the business of their agencies without
necessarily proceeding through cumbersome and hierarchical grievance structures. By strongly intimating in Givban that the public
employee has free speech rights qua public employee, the Court
takes the first step toward constitutional protection for the "whistleblower," an increasingly common phenomenon in American public life. 132
Finally, Givban may say something special about schools. Possibly much of the foregoing applies only or with stronger force in
schools, rather than in public employment generally. When Dwight
Eisenhower was president of Columbia University, he addressed the
faculty as "employees of the university," only to be interrupted by
a senior faculty member who observed that "We are not emplo'yees
of this university. We are this university." 133 This may strike a
responsive chord in those who have witnessed the increasing bureaucracy and hierarchical structure of the American university. The
extent to which openness and internal criticism are as valuable in
primary and secondary schools as they are in the university is very
possibly a quite different matter. The Court, however, may be
spealr.ing in more general terms. One may infer from Givban the
view that schools are to a degree special, that traditional organization
charts and hierarchical structures may be inconsistent with the
131

391 U.S. at 571-72.

Comment, Govenmzent Employee Disclosures of Agency ·wrongdoing:
Protecting the Right to Blow tbe Wbistle, 42 U. CHr. L. REv. 530 (1975); The
TVbistleblowers, a Report on Federal Employees Wbo Disclose Acts of Governmental VVaste, Abuse, and Cormption, prepared for Senate Committee on Gov132 See

ernmental Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 1978); GovERNMENT AccoUNTABILITY
PROJEcr, A WHISTLEBLOWER's GuiDE TO THE FEDERAL BuREAUCRACY (1977).
133

ADAMS, THE ACADEMIC TRIBES 15 (1976).
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openness that some consider inherent in the processes of education and academic inquiry. This is undoubtedly quite far afield from
what is directly found in the opinion in Givhan. Yet if these observations about the implications of Givhan are correct, the Court may
have taken the first step toward recognizing academic freedom as
a principle and not a platitude. But, like the issue of public speech
and private speech, the Court tells us little and leaves much for
speculation.

IV.

CoNCLUSION

On closer analysis, the opinion in Givhan, in rejecting the
distinction between public speech and private speech, and in further
extending free speech principles within the walls of the schoolhouse, has much to commend it. But the implications of Givhan
are considerable, and the opinion raises more questions than it answers. The opinion is, thus, both too clear and too obscure. A reading
of the opinion may lead lower courts to ignore the extent to which
the public-private distinction remains relevant in applying certain
accepted justifications for restricting speech. In this sense the words
say too much. On the other hand, a reading of Givhan may lead
lower courts to underestimate its effect on the issue of academic
freedom and on the issue of freedom of speech in the academic
setting. On both the issue of private speech and the issue of speech
in the schools much more remains to be said. We can do little more
than guess as to the extent to which the Court will follow the implications of Givhan. It is a pity that the brevity of the opinion
leaves so much to speculation.

